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SOME STRUCTURAL DILEMMAS OF WORLD
ORGANIZATION*
C. Wilfred Jenks**
We now have a quarter-century of experience with the general scheme
of world organization embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.
What light does that experience throw on the fundamental structural
dilemmas which the Charter was an attempt to resolve? In posing this
broad question I have no intention of attempting to assess the extent to
which the United Nations has fulfilled or disappointed the expectations
of its founders or has succeeded or failed in a balance sheet context. My
concern is not with a political estimate of past, present, or future prospects but with the bearing of a quarter of a century of experience on
some of the fundamental structural problems of world organization.
Three such problems were very much in the minds of most of us in
San Francisco in 1945. They were not new problems; they had been
familiar conundrums in League of Nations days. They were problems
of checks and balances in the Montesquieu tradition which had so profound an influence on the basic concepts of American public law. Succinctly put they were the problems of the balance between the burden
of responsibility implicit in power and the rights of all; the balance
between the oneness of all international effort and the healthy vigor of
its constituent elements; and the balance between the new measure of
international authority essential to the establishment of an organized
common peace and the continued freedom of action of the separate
members of the world community. These cumulative and interlocking
relationships among the weight of influence and responsibility and the
*These comments were originally presented October 25, 1971, as one of the John A. Sibley
Lectures in Law given at the University of Georgia School of Law, Athens, Georgia. Mr. Jenks'
remarks are presented here in their original format.
**Director General, International Labor Organization; LL.D. (Cantab.), Hon. LL.D. (Edinburgh), of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law.
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weight of numbers, the coherence of the whole and the vitality of the
parts, and interdependence and independence or, stating the issue more
sharply, world order and national sovereignty, now confront us as dilemmas at every juncture in the further development of world organization.
All three dilemmas are adumbrated, though not fully discussed, in the
Report to the Presidenton the Results of the San FranciscoConference
by the Secretary of State' in terms which reflect the thinking of the time.
The Report stressed that the authors of the Charter intended to contrast
the authority of the Security Council, based on the continued unity of
the great powers, with the role of the General Assembly as "the town
meeting of the world." The basic concept was much simpler than what
proved necessary in actual practice. "In the framework of the United
Nations", the Report reads, "the provisions for the General Assembly
give recognition to the principle of the sovereign equality of all nations.
The provisions for the Security Council recognize the special responsibilities of the great powers for maintaining the peace and the fact that
the maintenance of their unity is the crucial political problem of our
time." 2 None of this has ceased to be true, but it has proved to be much
less than the whole truth. Yet the point of departure stated in the Secretary of State's letter to the President summarizing the Report has lost
none of its cogency. "Men and women who have lived through war are
not ashamed, as other generations sometimes are, to declare the depth
and the idealism of their attachment to the cause of peace. But neither
are they ashamed to recognize the realities of force and power which
3
war has forced them to see and to endure."9
The Report stated with particular clarity the rationale of the decentralized structure of the economic and social functions of the United
Nations system:
The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the
security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is
the economic and social front where victory means freedom from
want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring
peace.
In the next twenty-five years the development of the economic and
social foundations of peace will be of paramount importance. If the
United Nations cooperate effectively toward an expanding world economy, better living conditions for all men and women, and closer under'Dep't State Publication No. 2349, Conf. Ser. No. 71 (June 26, 1945).
11d. at 67.
3
id. at 12.
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standing among peoples, they will have gone far toward eliminating in
advance the causes of another world war a generation hence. If they
fail, there will be instead widespread depressions and economic warfare which would fatally undermine the world organization. No provisions that can be written into the Charter will enable the Security
Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have
no security in their homes and in their jobs.4
To foster cooperation in all these fields is a vast undertaking ...
Arrangements for international cooperation in security matters are
largely centered in the Security Council. By contrast, international
economic and social issues cannot be dealt with by any one agency.
Effective cooperation in fields so diverse and so fundamental to nations
and individuals as the movement of trade, monetary stability, public
health, freedom of the press, or aviation, requires the creation of specified agencies, some of which are already functioning while others are
being planned.'
The Report further noted:
The Charter (Articles 57, 63) provides that these specialized organizations shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations
through special agreements to be negotiated between them and the
Economic and Social Council, subject to the approval of the General
Assembly.
In order to permit the Economic and Social Council and the specialized organizations a maximum of freedom in negotiating these agreements, the Charter has little to say about their nature and content.
They may well differ from case to case. It will be the function of the
Organization to coordinate rather than to control. . . .The design is
clear: the specialized agencies are to be accorded the greatest measure
of freedom and initiative compatible with purposeful and coordinated
action on the part of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social
Council and the agencies and organizations brought into relationship
with them.
There could be no more conclusive proof than these statements that the
decentralized structure of the economic and social functions of the
United Nations system was a conscious design based on overall policy.
Thus, the result was not, as its critics have sometimes supposed, a series
of historical accidents or the undisciplined pressures of special interests
uncontrolled by an adequate concern for general policy.
'ld. at 109.
5
1d. at 111.
'Id. at 119-120.
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The Report discussed the third dilemma, perhaps the most fundamental of the three, in a more tangential manner:
In the present state, at least, of world opinion, an international legislative body is out of the question, since the several nations are not willing
to sacrifice their sovereignty to the extent of permitting an international legislature to enact laws binding upon them or on their peoples.
At the same time, an assembly with the power to discuss but without
the power to reach conclusions, is not an effective forum for the discussion of real issues or for the focusing of opinion.7
The General Assembly was, therefore, given functions which could be
broadly described as being "to deliberate, to administer, to elect, to
approve budgets and to initiateamendments."' Of the budgeting powers
the Report said:
The allocation to the General Assembly of the task of apportioning the
expenses and approving the budgets of the Organization is an extension
to the international field of the fundamental principle of democratic
government that the purse strings should be held by the most widely
representative organ. 9
In this broad principle lay secreted one of the most sensitive of current
problems.* The broader question of where international action stops and
national freedom of action begins, with its converse, was not, and at the
time could not have been, brought into any clear focus.
The fundamental nature of these dilemmas has been abundantly confirmed by the experience of the intervening years; they remain the fundamental structural dilemmas of world organization.
The counterpoise of the Security Council and the General Assembly,
the comparable logic of weighted voting in the International Monetary
7

1d. at 54.
11d. at 55; See U.N. CHARTER art. 10-17.
1d. at 57.
*[Editor's Note] As an example of the sensitive nature of this topic, consider the fact that ten
percent of the world's population and five percent of the contributors to the United Nations can
now cast two-thirds of the votes in the General Assembly. This makes it possible for the large
majority of small states to override the wishes of the largest contributors. However, it is significant
to note, that on December 13, 1972, the General Assembly voted 81 to 27 with 22 abstentions to
reduce the United States contribution to the United Nations regular budget from 31.5 percent to
25 percent. This in effect reduces the ceiling on an individual nation's contributions to 25 percent,
on the principle that the United Nations should not be overly dependent on any one nation. This
action was taken despite a strong opposition led by the Soviet Union. The General Assembly's
approval of the reduction avoided a possible internal conflict within the United States since the
Congress has expressed a strong sentiment in favor of reducing United States contributions. See
N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1972, at I, col. 1.
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Fund and the World Bank and its affiliates, and the place of the States
of Chief Industrial Importance in the Governing Body of the International Labor Office, have not provided an accepted solution for the
problem of securing a reasonable balance between weight of influence
and responsibility and weight of numbers. The problem has indeed become increasingly acute with the years, and greatly accentuated by the
weight of an ever-increasing organization membership though this has
not been the only important factor in the situation.
The balance was impaired almost from the outset by the failure to
maintain the unity of the great powers and by the frequent use of vetoes
to paralyze the Security Council. In the Uniting for Peace Resolution
of 1950,11 the General Assembly assumed the power to make recommendations whenever the Security Council fails to come to a decision. This
decisive step was almost inevitable in a process of shifting the center of
gravity of the United Nations from the Security Council to the General
Assembly. As the scope of United Nations action expanded, the budgetary authority of the General Assembly became increasingly important.
In the same manner in which the spending power has been a decisive
increment to national authority in federal systems of government, so the
power to finance new international activities has given the General Assembly a central role. The General Assembly which now exercises these
powers is a very different body from the General Assembly of 1946. The
membership of the United Nations has more than doubled and reflects
a wholly changed political structure of the world. One state, one vote,
was never more than a rough and ready alternative for the absence of
any more satisfactory formula. It has become an increasingly unsatisfactory basis of representation as the degree of distortion of representative quality has grown. The composition of the General Assembly now
reflects a political structure of the world shaped by historical and geographical accident, artificial by any rational criterion, and wholly anachronistic. Where men have established a common form of government on a continental or subcontinental scale they are underrepresented. Where men have broken apart into states so small that these
cannot "stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" they are overrepresented. In both cases the representation
of men has been lost in the representation of states; respect for the
sovereignty of the state has excluded any consideration of the extent to
which the General Assembly as a whole fairly represents mankind. It
clearly does not. North America, north of the Rio Grande, with a
"G.A. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).

6
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population of 227 million, is represented by two members with two
votes; the English speaking Caribbean, with a population of 4.8 million,
by four members with four votes; Latin America, with a population of
278 million, by twenty members with twenty votes. China, India and
Japan, with a combined population of 1,432 million, or over 39 percent
of the human race, have three votes; the rest of Asia and Oceania
(excluding Australia and New Zealand), with a population of 554 million, is represented by eighteen members with eighteen votes. The Arab
world, with a population of 125 million, is now represented by seventeen
members with seventeen votes, and this number seems likely to be further increased; Israel has one. The rest of Africa, with a population of
258 million, is represented by thirty-four members with thirty-four
votes. The members of the "Council of Europe" with a population of
312.6 million, are represented by fifteen members with fifteen votes; the
USSR, with a population of 243 million, by three members with three
votes, and the other communist states of Central and Eastern Europe,
with a population of 127 million, by seven members with seven votes.
While this disproportion may be to some extent offset by the power of
large states to influence the votes of small states this makeup still disregards many forces. The result is a tendency to discredit still further the
legislative quality of the General Assembly and other international bodies. Thus, compared with this pattern the unreformed House of Commons prior to the Great Reform Bill of 1832, or the composition of
American legislatures prior to redistricting at the behest of the Supreme
Court, were models of equitable representation.
The inequities of the one state, one vote system might be partially
offset if it could be claimed that the system reflects political realities.
This is true only in the sense that the system accords the claims of the
smallest and weakest states a status of equality to that of the largest and
most powerful. To the state vigorously asserting it, this claim is no
doubt a political reality, but it has no relationship to the realities of
power or responsibility measured by any other test. There is of course
no agreed basis for calculating relative power and responsibility, but for
the purpose of consideration of the United Nations we may take as a
rough criterion the scale of contributions to the budget. The five largest
contributors contribute 63 percent, the next ten largest a further 20.40
percent, and the remaining 111 the remaining 16.60 percent. The scale
is by no means a faithful reflection in all cases of relative economic
strength, but it gives vivid expression to the general order of the problem. In these circumstances it is not surprising that a majority in the
General Assembly should seek to exercise there a power which they do
not enjoy elsewhere. Nor is it surprising that the powerful should resist
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the encroachment of the authority of the General Assembly upon the
realities of power, and that the outcome should be a deadlock of mutual
frustration in which neither the authority of the General Assembly in
the United Nations system nor the realities of power in the world of
states have an adequate impact on each other.
To state the problem is not to solve it or even to suggest that any
satisfactory solution exists. It is even more difficult in international than
in national policies to start afresh. The possibilities of the present are
limited by the errors of the past. The "town meeting of the world"
remains a central element in any conceivable scheme of world organization. Can we conceive of any change in its composition, its functions,
its procedures or its relationship to other international bodies, existing
or to be created, which would give us a more satisfactory overall pattern
of world organization?
It is difficult to imagine any significant change in the basis of composition of the General Assembly while the world remains a world of states
and the United Nations an organization of states. Most of the bolder
schemes for world government involve a complete departure from the
pattern. In such schemes suggested new types of World Assembly would
embody in varied forms principles such as weighted voting, or the allocation of seats on the basis of a formula balancing population resources
with other factors. In the boldest plans, there are provisions for the
direct or indirect election of representatives to replace representatives
designated by and responsible to governments. Such schemes envisage
a wholly new political structure for the world, involving a world government of a federal type. Political probabilities apart, they present structural problems which we have only begun to define. The realistic course
is to assume that for the immediate future the General Assembly will
continue to be composed on the present basis and will consist of representatives of all member states of the United Nations with one vote for
each state.
The functions and procedures of a General Assembly so composed
may be more open to review than its composition. The Charter states
the functions of the General Assembly only in the most general terms
and there have been and will continue to be changes in the balance of
their relative importance. Much of the General Assembly's operation
depends on the calendar and condition of international business at the
time, the effectiveness of the Security Council and the Economic and
Social Council at the time and the degree of reliance placed on special
conferences, other methods of negotiation, and other international procedures. The arrangement whereby, in one way or another, almost anyone can place almost anything on the agenda of the General Assembly
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may call for reconsideration. While the function of the General Assembly as the "town meeting of the world" neither can nor should be
abridged, the relationship of this function to the governmental processes
of international society taken as a whole may need thorough review.
The procedures of the General Assembly are its own creation and
remain its creature. The Charter empowers the General Assembly to
"adopt its own rules of procedure,"" and "establish such subsidiary
organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. '"' The
only limitations on the General Assembly's procedural discretion embodied in the Charter are the requirement that "the General Assembly
shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as
occasion may require"' 3 and the provisions governing voting. 4 Everything else is governed by rules and practice, which could be changed as
part of a plan for a more effective United Nations. It may be that
because of inertia, vested interests or weight of voting power no changes
will take place except as the outcome of a crisis. But since the potential
exists for a crisis which would jeopardize the entire future of the United
Nations system, it is well to give some thought to the nature of changes
in the procedure of the General Assembly which might help to avert or
resolve such a crisis.
First, there should be some reconsideration of the system whereby the
General Assembly operates through main committees composed of
equal representation from each delegation. This system is a legacy from
League of Nations days when, as the result of the unanimity principle,
it operated quite differently in practice, ensuring that every voice which
might veto a decision in the Assembly was heard in committee. Its
present effect, however, is to build into every successive stage of the
procedure the artificiality of the present distribution of voting power in
the General Assembly itself. It is highly unusual for large deliberative
bodies to do virtually all of their business in committees of the whole.
No major legislative body works in this way. One can conceive of a
compromise between the principle of one state, one vote and the various
alternatives for it which have been suggested. This compromise would
consist essentially of retaining the principle of one state, one vote at
plenary meetings of the General Assembly as required by the Charter,
"U.N. CHARTER art. 21.
11Id. art. 22.
"Id. art. 20.
"The effect of the voting provisions is spelled out in article 18. Paragraph 2 provides that
"decisions . . . on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members
present and voting." On other questions, paragraph 3 provides that the decision be made "by a
majority of the members present and voting." Id. art. 18.
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but as is also permitted by the Charter, composing the committees
which submit recommendations to the General Assembly so that they
represent more equitably the contemporary balance of forces. In such
a compromise it would be possible to vary the composition of committees with their mandate, agenda, and the circumstances generally. Such
a system would involve a marked change in general direction, but there
are perhaps anticipations of it in such developments as the composition
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space or the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee. Something of this nature may be
necessary to preserve the reality of the United Nations system and in
particular to avoid a major financial crisis or series of recurrent financial crises. It would, of course, be at best a pragmatic solution, preserving the forms of the equality of states at the stage of formal action by
the General Assembly while respecting the realities of power and unequal national capacity to make a practical contribution to the work of
the General Assembly. As such it might work. There is no logical escape
from the dilemma, and the choice may be between this kind of empiricism and a United Nations system locked in a crisis of ever-increasing
unreality.
No less necessary to our discussion is a hard look at the question of
whether the United Nations relies too much on voting procedures to
determine questions which it cannot hope to settle. Twenty years ago I
wrote that:
[T]he voting procedures of the United Nations, which are based on the
majority principle qualified by the requirement of special majorities
for certain purposes and by the operation of a veto, have in present
political circumstances produced a situation in which power is frequently divorced from responsibility, voting tends to become a substitute for negotiation rather than a measure of the amount of agreement
reached or a final resort when negotiation fails, and the art of parliamentary manipulation is replacing that of diplomacy as a method of
handling international problems for which diplomacy alone can produce an agreed solution. I"
If this were already true in 1951, it is very much more so in 1971.
What kind of alternative can we envisage? I can see only one: a
greater reliance on negotiation rather than voting to resolve matters
which are in controversy. Unanimity as the general basis of international organization is a thing of the past, and rightly so, for it spells
paralysis. Weighted voting, majorities including specified votes, and
SC. W.

JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND

174 (1958). This presents a reproduction of

an address which the author delivered to the Grotius Society on October 26, 1951.
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special majorities may provide elements of a solution in specific contexts but are not solutions of general application.
At the time of the crisis in the General Assembly concerning the
applicability of Article 19 of the Charter to states in arrears in the
payment of their assessments for the financing of peace-keeping operations, I ventured to make the following suggestion:
A wider acceptance of the principle of consensus represents the only
realistic approach to many of our difficulties. The only valid test of
the value of international organization is the effectiveness of the results
secured. With an increasing recognition of the importance of consensus
as an element in effectiveness there may be a growing disposition to
prefer the negotiated agreement to the unilateral pronunciamento. In
world organizations, as in human affairs generally, one may reasonably hope that a growing maturity will be reflected in mellower reasonableness. Whatever can be done to institutionalise the provision of opportunities for expanding the scope for reasonableness may represent
the most important contribution that can be made in the immediate
future to resolving the problem of how international decisions should
be taken."6
This still, in my judgment, represents the only realistic approach.
The essence of this approach consists of trying to live with the structural dilemma of balancing the burden of responsibility implicit in
power and the rights of all. The balance should be achieved by the
practice of wisdom and restraint rather than trying to resolve it by some
fundamental structural change for which no widely acceptable formula
appears to be available. Such an equilibrium between the weight of
power and the weight of numbers presupposes a minimum of understanding between centers of power. This fundamental concept is indeed
explicit in the Charter itself. If we reject the concept that the powerful
have responsibilities which they must share, we are left with no foundation for a responsible and realistic United Nations system.
To the British constitutional lawyer none of this involves a surrender
to pure politics. We are upon the familiar ground of the conventions of
the constitution without which the law of the constitution is unworkable.
May not the United Nations now need a Dicey 7 to give intellectual
consistency and cogency to the conventions of the Charter, the only law
"6Jenks, Unanimity, The Veto, Weighted Voting, Special and Simple Majorities and Consensus
as Modes of Decision in International Organisation, in CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 48, 63 (1965).
"See A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed.
1959).
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of the constitution which we have or are likely to have in our time?
Without such an expression the Charter will become increasingly unreal.
Is not the only solution for otherwise insoluble problems a firm respect
for certain accepted conventions of responsibility?
Our second dilemma is to maintain a reasonable balance between the
oneness of all international effort and the healthy vigor of its constituent
elements. The dilemma was a difficult one even at the outset; it has
become substantially more difficult during the years which have elapsed
since San Francisco.
The decentralized structure of world organization has become far
more complex than could then have been envisaged. Successive phases
in the development of the United Nations system have added new elements to the system. New problems, new approaches to old problems,
and new balances of power in the evaluation of problems have been
given institutional expression. Whereas at the early meetings of the
Administrative Committee on Co-ordination of the United Nations and
the Specialized Agencies there were eight participating organizations,
there are now twenty-three, with further additions probable. Regional
organizations have become more important than was foreseen. The
United Nations system now has cooperative relationships with nine
major regional systems and many other regional organizations.
For an increasing number of states admission to the United Nations
as participants in so complex an international system represents a burden exceeding both the present capacity of their national administrative
structures and in some cases their financial resources. There has been
growing criticism of the complexity of the system. There is also a tendency to reject the conscious design on which the system was based,
partly because that design reflects a complexity in the structure of government foreign to the new states which centralize authority in the Chief
of State and his immediate advisers. In these states the interlocking of
international and national action which the decentralized system was
designed to promote loses much of its reality. While these developments
have been occurring, various aspects of public policy have interacted
more closely as the result of broader and more integrated economic and
social policies and the growing importance of comprehensive development planning in many countries. The increasing proportion of international action which is operational in character and closely related to
development plans has given added importance to this factor.
Given this background, the continuing increase in international budgets combined with the continuing inadequacy of the resources available
to meet well-established needs has caused a recurrent questioning of the
rationale of the whole system.
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This recurrent questioning, in my view, underestimates the legal and
practical difficulties of fundamentally recasting the present system. It
overlooks the capacity for growth, adaptation, constantly improving
coordination, and increasingly purposeful common action which has
been demonstrated and disregards the extent to which this cooperation
operates as a counterpoise to the structural weaknesses of the United
Nations itself. Finally, it fails to provide any convincing alternative for
the system's original rationale which remains valid.
The decentralized system, because it is the outcome of deliberate
decisions of policy at the highest level and elaborate negotiations among
governments, is embodied in a complex of treaty engagements. These
treaties have received world-wide ratification because of their special
safeguards and procedures. They cannot be modified by resolution of
the General Assembly or any other simplified or expeditious procedure.
To renegotiate them would be a Herculean task-dangerous at this time
because of the retrogression in willingness to accept international engagements-and disproportionate at any time in the foreseeable future
to any result likely to be attained thereby.
The existing framework of the decentralized system has permitted a
process of continuous development which has changed profoundly its
practical operation. It has given us the elements of a much more closely
knit world system, and can achieve much more with imaginative and
determined leadership. To demonstrate this with chapter and verse
would require a volume but the evidence is comprehensive and convincing. It may be said, however, that the decentralized system ensures a
diffusion, and in some cases a weighting, of authority which to some
extent offsets the structural weaknesses of the United Nations itself.
The original rationale of the decentralized system remains unanswered and unanswerable. What is that rationale? "The whole scheme
rests upon the underlying assumption that there cannot be, in the modern world, any single focus of authority where decisions on matters of
international concern can be centralized."' 8 That assumption remains
true. May I elaborate the point in language which I have used before:
As the modern State has become the welfare State, government has
ceased to be the prerogative of a small number of central departments
of State, notably treasuries and foreign offices. It has become a complex of public services embracing every aspect of the life of the community. Within this complex there are recognised arrangements for
"Jenks, Co-ordination in International Organization:An Introductory Survey, 28 BRIT. Y.B.
L. 29, 88 (1951).
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evolving general policy, but as the life of the community becomes more
complex, and the machinery and procedures of government are increasingly adapted to its changing needs, these arrangements seek essentially a coordinated diffusion of responsibility. World organisation
is evolving in the same direction and manner. Twentieth-century world
affairs cannot be conducted by foreign offices and treasuries; they
embrace too broad a spectrum of human affairs and interests. To be
practically effective contemporary world organisation must interlock
at innumerable different points with national arrangements with a
continuing responsibility for policy and action; it must actively involve
in continuous international cooperation all the major departments of
government with substantive responsibility for the increasing range of
questions with important international aspects and leave them the freedom of action necessary to enable them to conduct their collective
business successfully and implement their decisions by action within
the scope of their recognised departmental responsibilities.
These are fundamentals of policy and political structure which outweigh the admitted inconveniences of the decentralised system.,'
The upshot is that we must continue to live with the second as with
the first of our three dilemmas and recognize that the only solution for
otherwise insoluble problems lies once more in a firm respect for certain
accepted conventions of responsibility.
The third dilemma is the institutional equivalent of the classical problem of the relationship of international and municipal law. Much of the
discussion of it revolves around the purport, scope, and effect of the
principle set forth in the Charter that the United Nations shall not
"intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."" ° While controversy concerning this principle continues to weigh upon political psychology, the real issues lie elsewhere. The
Permanent Court of International Justice declared as long ago as 1923
that "the question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the
jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question" and "depends
upon the development of international relations."2 1 In the United Nations period the development of international relations has brought virtually everything within the scope of international discussion and there
is now little inhibition on the discussion of anything in the United Nations. As irritating, unfair, irresponsible, and far from impartial as
discussion may sometimes be, there is a balance of advantage in the full
"C.W. JENKS, A NEW WORLD OF LAW? 235 (1969).

"U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
"Advisory Opinion on Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No.
4 at 24.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 3: 1

freedom of speech provided by the "town meeting of the world." Between discussion and intervention there remains a wide margin, with an
increasing tendency not to construe as intervention any form of international action which falls short of coercion by armed force. The real
problems center on the balance of international obligation and national
discretion in respect of the vital functions of any system of government,
international no less than national: law enforcement by the prevention
and suppression of breaches of the peace; the settlement of differences
and disagreements by adjudication or other effective procedures of
peaceful settlement; the constant reattuning of law to life by legislation;
and finance, the sinews of peace no less than of war. In all these matters
there remains a hiatus between the requirements of world order and
political attitudes based on established constitutional practice and traditions.
When I was first writing on international law, forty years ago, we
gave a good deal of thought to what we then called the constitutional
substructure of the collective system and were much concerned with the
modifications of constitutional law and practice which would be necessary to make an effective international system workable.2" The topic
became an unrealistic one, particularly in the terms in which we then
conceived it, before the Second World War occurred. I know of no
thorough reexamination of it since that time. Important everywhere, it
is especially important in relation to constitutional systems which, like
that of the United States, are based upon the separation of powers. In
more recent years this fundamental problem appears to have attracted
much less attention from a scholarship overburdened with other preoccupations.
The potentially gravest issues are those relating to law enforcement
by the prevention and suppression of breaches of the peace. The fulfillment of the obligations of the Charter, and in particular the obligation
to carry out the decisions of the Security Council, may involve major
political and military decisions and the exercise of far-reaching legal
powers. In countries like the United States, enabling legislation, such
as the United Nations Participation Act, 3 has given recognition to the
exercise of such powers not involving the employment of armed forces.
There is now some practical experience of recourse to such powers. The
provision of the Charter for the negotiation of special agreements with
the Security Council having remained ineffective, however, there is no
22

See, e.g., Zimmern, et al., The InternationalAspect of the Indian Constitution, in I
125-184 (1933).
'United Nations Participation Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 287 (1964).
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comparable authority for the employment of armed forces to give effect
to a decision of the Security Council. There is, therefore, a continuing
gap between international obligation and constitutional authority in
respect of the most vital of the functions of the United Nations and the
most politically sensitive and potentially serious of all areas of international obligation. Where the balance of authority between the representatives of the people and the executive in respect of matters of foreign
policy and military action has become acutely controversial, the probability of deadlock has become almost a certainty. While particularly
acute, and liable to be particularly intractable, under systems of government based on the separation of powers, the problem is by no means
limited to them. It may find expression in parliamentary upheaval no
less than in congressional deadlock.
The question of constitutional authority to submit to international
adjudication and give effect to the decision or award impinges less
immediately on imminent threats to the peace but raises another aspect
of the same fundamental issue. The question takes different forms in
different countries. In the United Kingdom, for instance, it appears to
be well established that the Crown can submit anything to international
adjudication in the exercise of the prerogative in advance of or at the
time of the specific question's arising. Any decision, however, cannot be
given effect if it requires changing the law, paying money, or, by constitutional convention, ceding British territory without legislative sanctions. In the United States the matter has a long history, including the
rejection by the Senate of the Olney-Pauncefote Treaty 4 in 1897, the
Roosevelt Arbitration Treaties 5 in 1905, and the Taft-Knox Arbitration
Treaties2" in 1911, on the ground that the obligation to arbitrate without
reference to the Senate in each case was an encroachment on its prerogatives. That this is not wholly ancient history is demonstrated by the
persistence of the Connally Amendment to legislation providing for the
acceptance by the United States of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, excluding from such acceptance matters
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States as determined by the United States. 2 The progress of compulsory jurisdiction,
and of international adjudication, insofar as its progress depends on a
2
For text of treaty see 5 A.J.1.L. 88 (Supp. 1911); [1896] FOREIGN REL. U.S. 238 (1897). See
generally 7 MOORE, INT'L L. DIGEST 74-78 (1906).
25Reprinted in Ii MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1648-1967, 1149 (F. Israel ed.
1967).
26
See generally C. G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 618 (4th ed. 1965); 2 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 17 at 31) (7th ed. 1952).
2See generally W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 70-71 n. 148 (3d ed. 1971).
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wider measure of compulsory jurisdiction, presupposes some solution of
this element in the dilemma of the gap between international obligation
and constitutional authority.
Another context in which the same fundamental issue arises is that
of the creation of new law by treaty. Internationally, as in the national
community, the law cannot keep pace with life without a vigorous legislative process. We now have the elements of a vigorous international
legislative process. In far too many cases international legislative effort
is ineffective because the outcome, perhaps the only possible outcome,
of international negotiation is treated as subject to amendment by legislative process in the same manner as legislative proposals wholly within
the authority and responsibility of the national legislature. The extent
of the problem cannot be measured by the number of cases in which an
"amendment" to a treaty has prevented ratification or limited its value
and practical effectiveness. It is virtually impossible to estimate in how
many cases no action was taken, or action was too long deferred, primarily because of the potential embarrassment of legislative "amendment" of the treaty as negotiated. In this context no international obligation has yet arisen, but the gap between international negotiation and
constitutional authority becomes a serious bar to the development of
more effective international legislative procedures which the needs of
the world community, and the interests of all its members, so urgently
require.
The gap between international obligation and constitutional authority
is still more striking in relation to the financing of international organizations. The Charter of the United Nations provides clearly that "the
expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly,' 2 and the constitutions of other international organizations contain equivalent provisions. These provisions
create unequivocal obligations, and if they did not the whole structure
of international organization would inevitably collapse. This is an
unpalatable position to legislative bodies which find uncongenial the
distinction between their final authority to appropriate and tax for national purposes, and the function of voting appropriations to meet legally binding international assessments. Yet these assessments must be
binding if we are to have any international system at all. The distinction
is not always, and perhaps only rarely, understood, and when understood it tends to be resented, not unnaturally, as nothing is less palatable
to power than to be confronted with the limits of its power. The crux
"sU.N.
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of the matter is that only the executive can act for the state internationally and participate in international decisions assessing contributions on
member states. Thus, the international representative body that assesses
contributions upon member states is, in the eyes of national representative bodies, composed of appointees from a governmental branch that
possesses no taxing power. The answer in law is, of course, simple and
conclusive. The Charter of the United Nations and constitutions of the
other international organizations have been fully accepted by, and
thereby become legal obligations of member states, each acting by its
appropriate constitutional procedure. These obligations bind the state
and all its organs, including the legislature in its capacity as the appropriating authority. In law there is nothing more to be said. There remains the political problem.
There is no neat solution for this complex of problems. They involve
a major structural dilemma: that of the difficulty of reconciling the
effectiveness of the world system with the continued freedom of the
participating nations. In respect of this, as of our first and second dilemmas, the only solution in sight for otherwise insoluble problems lies in
a firm respect for certain accepted conventions of responsibility.
This may well appear a disappointing conclusion to an apparently
promising line of inquiry. The fundamental structural dilemmas which
the Charter was an attempt to resolve remain fundamental dilemmas
still far from resolution. Is this a conclusion to be dismissed as disappointing or does it suggest that the Charter was well conceived and gives
us as good an instrument as we can hope to have to shape future policy
wisely? Does not the answer to most of our problems lie in a much
higher sense of responsibility in international and national bodies alike?
There is neither justification nor cure for irresponsibility in international
or national bodies. The escalation of irresponsibility is one of the gravest
dangers in the contemporary outlook for world organization. Irresponsibility at either the national or the international level tends to prompt
and aggravate further irresponsibility at the other. There is no solution
for any of our structural dilemmas except in a broader sanity, a calmer
deliberateness, a more consistent loyalty to principle, a cooler courage.
Let that be the tone and temper of our common resolve to grapple
firmly with our otherwise insoluble problems. We live in a world with a
new scale of things, a new system of things, and a new complexity of
things; we must match these with a new and much higher standard of
responsibility.

